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PARENTAL CONSENT:

Tim

NEED FOR AN INFORMED DECISION

IN THE PRIVATE ADOPTION SCHEME

Introduction
Louisiana offers two methods of adoption-agency adoption and
private adoption. Licensed adoption agencies generally provide the natural mother with an experienced trained staff able to help her not only
to cope with her decision, but also to understand fully the ramifications
of her actions. It is this source of counselling regarding the alternatives
available and the legal consequences of surrendering the child for adoption that constitutes one of the main advantages of the agency method.'
Agency adoption also offers the parties a degree of certainty which, as
will be shown below, is unavailable under the private scheme, in that
the formal act of surrender in an agency adoption is, absent a vice of
2
consent, irrevocable.
Private adoptions entail a more informal procedure. Some of the
safeguards traditionally associated with agency adoptions are conspicuously absent. A well-meaning relative or friend, who may act as an
intermediary, seldom has the training or experience demanded by the
complexity of the situation. Even if the intermediary is a more knowledgeable professional, such as an attorney or medical doctor, he may
neglect to convey much needed information to the mother.3 A major
deficiency in private adoptions, then, is the natural mother's usual lack
of access to information essential for her to make an informed decision.
This comment will examine the implications of, and several alternatives
to, this flawed scheme.
Should Private Adoptions be Outlawed?
In view of this inadequacy of private adoptions, one alternative
would be to outlaw that method of adoption.4 By eliminating this
informal procedure, natural mothers would theoretically be compelled

Copyright 1987, by LouISINA LAW REvIEw.
1. See Frieden, The Constitutional Rights of Natural Parents Under New York's
Adoption Statutes, 12 Rev. L. & Soc. Change 617, 626 (1983).
2. Allen v. Volunteers of Am., 378 So. 2d 1030 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
3. W. Meezan, S. Katz, and E. Russo, Adoptions Without Agencies-A Study of
Independent Adoptions 5 [hereinafter Meezan].
4. Five states have outlawed private adoptions: Minnesota, Connecticut, Delaware,
Michigan, and Massachusetts.
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to utilize the services of an agency, thus receiving the greater protections

offered in an agency adoption.
Nevertheless, agency adoptions involve significant disadvantages which

must be addressed. An agency imposes a more complicated process,
perceived by many as inflexible, impersonal and an invasion of privacy.'

Medical care is typically offered through public hospitals or clinics which
may not provide the staff or facilities which the mother may prefer.
Finally, the obvious corollary of the implementation of counselling,

which leads to a more informed decision by the mother, is the extended
period of time required for such a process.
Private adoptions, though lacking in the requisite informative communication, do offer other benefits. In private adoptions, hospital costs
may be assumed by the prospective adoptive parent, thus enabling the

mother to select a medical facility of her choice. Private adoption also
allows the natural mother to maintain an element of control over her
child's future. For example, she may wish to specify the type of home
in which she would like the child placed, or she may request information
6
concerning the prospective adoptive parents .
While recognizing these considerations, a state may perceive agency
adoption as the better method when viewed in its entirety. However,
serious consequences may result when agency adoption becomes the sole
available method. As with any monopoly, there exists a great potential
for abuse. Statutes governing agencies would have to be revised to
prevent any intermediary from simply qualifying as an agency.' The
widespread acceptance of contraceptives, abortions, and unwed motherhood has resulted in a shortage of infants available for adoption.' The
improbability of an agency's ability to meet the increased demands of
a much larger clientele suggests the real possibility of an increase in
black market adoptions. 9 These findings reflect only a sampling of the
results of a national research study entitled Adoptions Without Agencies:
A Study of Independent Adoptions, conducted by William Meezan,
Sanford Katz, and Eva Manoff Russo.
Outlawing private adoption, therefore, may not be the definitive
answer. A better solution would be to impose upon the private adoption
scheme the advantages of impressing upon the natural mother the legal
consequences of her action, thus leading to a more informed decision.

5. Meezan, supra note 3, at 10-11.
6. Frieden, supra note 1, at 627.
7.
8.
9.

Meezan, supra note 3, at 232-233.
Id. at 9.
Id.at 233.
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The Best Interests of the Child

Prior to 1960, the continuing consent of the natural parents was
required before a final decree of adoption could be granted. 10 This
allowed the natural parent who experienced a change of heart to regain
custody of the child. Consequently, a child who had formed emotional
attachments could suddenly be snatched from his or her adoptive parents
and familiar surroundings." This also placed the natural parents in a
superior position by enabling them to use this requirement as a bargaining
tool in completing the financial arrangements.
In 1960 the legislature shortened the time period in which the natural
parent could revoke this consent.12 The natural parent's absolute right
of revocation could only be exercised prior to an interlocutory decree
rather than a final decree. Furthermore, revocation of consent between
the interlocutory and final decrees would not necessarily bar the adoption. 13

The Private Adoption Act of 197914 once again shortened the period
in which a natural parent may revoke consent, specifying that "the
parents .. .may oppose the adoption of the child surrendered only by
a . .. revocation made within thirty days after executing the ... sur-

render." More importantly, the Act significantly restricted the power of
revocation. Even a timely notice of revocation does not assure the return
of the child to the natural parent. 5 Instead, it only entitles the natural
parent to a hearing to determine what would be in the best interest of
the child. 16 In this hearing, the natural parent and the adoptive parent
are placed on equal footing. The pendulum thus swung from an absolute
focus upon the natural parent's needs to recognition of the child's needs
as paramount.
This shift of the legislature's focus was foreshadowed by the eminent
work of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit,1 7 who noted that "continuity of
relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence are essential for

10. In Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So. 2d 819, 820 (1947), the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated that the continuing consent of the natural parent was needed before a final
decree of adoption could be granted under Act 54 of 1942.
11. Note, In re CDT: The Need for Greater Clarity in Private Adoption, 44 La. L.
Rev. 845, 849 (1984).
12. La. R.S. 9:429 (1965 & Supp. 1987) (as amended by 1960 La. Acts No. 268 and
1979 La. Acts No. 686 § 4).
13. Id.
14. La. R.S. 9:422.3 to :422.12 (Supp. 1987) (added by 1979 La. Acts No. 686).
15. La. R.S. 9:422.11 (Supp. 1987).
16. Id.
17. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, and A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
(1973) [hereinafter Goldstein].
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a child's normal development. Since they do not play the same role in
later life, their importance is often underrated by the adult world."'"
The study stated that while this stability may be provided by the biological parents, the adoptive parents can provide it equally effectively
by becoming the child's "psychological parents."' 9 A psychological parent is "one, who on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological
needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs. The psychological
parent may be a biological ... [or] adoptive .. .parent ....
or any
other person." 20
The study also stated that after the initial assignment at birth, neither
the biological nor the adoptive parent can be presumed to be the
psychological parent. 2' The authors concluded that the implications of
their work in the area of adoption "are that each child placement [must]
be final and unconditional and that pending final placement a child
must not be shifted to accord with each tentative decision. "22
The 1979 amendments reflect these findings. One proponent 2a supported the bill because it would vest the court with the discretionary
power needed to ensure protection of the best interests of the child,
24
necessary because a child's early years are crucial to his development.
This amendment attempted to move private adoptions closer to agency
adoptions 25 by limiting the natural parent's ability to revoke consent to
the adoption. In this way, private adoptions would hopefully become
more attractive to prospective adoptive parents.
26
The legislators' stated primary concern was the welfare of the child.
27
The increased limits placed on the natural parent's right of revocation
manifest this concern, as they contribute toward ensuring a stable environment for the child. The legislators' efforts would have been more
effective, however, had they considered not only the revocation period,
but also the initial consent of the natural parents. As the court stated
in In re Shavor,2 "[a]lthough an adoption can now be granted even

18. Goldstein, supra note 17, at 31-32.
19. Id. at 17-19.
20. Id. at 98.
21. Id.
22. Id.at 35.
23. Otis Bedwell of the Louisiana Foster Parents Association appeared in support of
the bill.
24. Private Adoption Act: Hearing on Senate Bill No. 210 Before the La. Senate
Judiciary Committee (Minutes of Meeting, June 26, 1979).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. La. R.S. 9:422.11 (Supp. 1987) (added by 1979 La. Acts No. 686).
28. In re Shavor, 428 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 155
(La. 1983).

1987]

COMMENTS

when consent is withdrawn, a valid initial consent is still a prerequisite. '29
If the consent is invalid from the beginning, the revocation period is
inapplicable. The parent may claim that a valid consent was never given,
thus nullifying the entire adoption proceedings. 0
Strengthening the Private Adoption Scheme
The required contents of the formal act of surrender are specified
in Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 9:422.6.31 In order to strengthen
the validity of the initial consent, additional measures should be adopted
to convey as much information as possible to the natural mother regarding her rights with respect to revocation of that consent.
The Supreme Court of Alaska faced a related question in the case
of B.J.B.A. v. M.J.B.32 The natural mother, in attempting to rescind
her surrender of her child, argued that the consent was defective for
not including a statement of her right of withdrawal. The statutory
provision governing relinquishment of parental rights contained such a
requirement. The court refuted the mother's argument, stating that the
requirement was inapplicable to a consent to adoption. However, the
court conceded that "it might be beneficial to include such a requirement
in [the statute], but that action is appropriate for consideration by the
legislature rather than this court." 33

29.
30.
31.

Id. at 954.
Note, supra note 11, at 850.
La. R.S. 9:422.6 (Supp. 1987) provides the following:
The formal act of surrender shall identify the parents or parent of the child
by name, parish of domicile, age, and marital status; shall identify the child
and the parish of birth of the child; shall indicate the name and address of
the person or persons to whom the surrender is made, or the name and address
of the representative of that person or persons; and shall recite: (1) the date
of birth of the child to be surrendered and that the act is not signed earlier
than the fifth day following that date; (2) that the parent or parents freely and
voluntarily surrender custody of the child for the purpose of private placement
and adoption; (3) that the parent or parents consent to the adoption; (4) that
the parent or parents have been informed and understand that their rights as
parents of the child are to be terminated, and (5) that notice and service of
any pleading of any sort in any subsequent adoption proceeding is waived.
Should a surrendering parent of the child be under the age of eighteen at the
time of signing, the formal act shall also recite that fact and shall state that
the surrendering parent under the age of eighteen is joined in signing the formal
act of surrender by those individuals indicated in R.S. 9:422.3. Each necessary
party must sign in the presence of a notary and two witnesses, although it is
not necessary that they sign the same instrument.
32. B.J.B.A. v. M.J.B., 620 P.2d 652 (Alaska 1980).
33. Id. at 655. Strobel v. Garrison, 255 Or. 16, 464 P.2d 688 (1970), cited in support
of this conclusion, recognized that "[slince the legislature has enacted statutes prescribing
how adoptions shall be accomplished, this court has no power to change . . . the law as
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There have been cases34 in which Louisiana courts have required a
statement of the right of revocation in the surrender form beyond what
the legislature has required. The resulting uncertainty makes it apparent
that not only should a statement of the right to revoke be included,
but more importantly, such a statement should emphasize that this right
is not absolute.
In the Louisiana case of In re G.0.11 the act of surrender contained
the following language: "this . . .Surrender is completely irrevocable,
if no written opposition is served . . .within thirty (30) days, after the
execution of the ... surrender." '3 6 The surrender form, however, failed

to specify the restricted nature of the right to revoke. The trial court
interpreted this language as granting an absolute right of revocation.
The trial judge found the surrender invalid because it proposed to exceed
legally permissible bounds. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal recognized
that this interpretation by the lower court was "not an unreasonable
37
one," but chose to rely on other grounds to invalidate the surrender.
In another Louisiana case, In re J.E.C.,3s the act of surrender

contained the same language. The court recognized the three attendant
effects of the formal act of surrender: it transfers custody to the adoptive
parent, it terminates parental rights of the natural parents, and it serves
as a consent to the adoption.3 9 The natural mother in In re J.E.C.
argued that the surrender was invalid because of the ambiguities in the
language it contained. 40 These ambiguities "led the natural mother to
believe she could execute an act of revocation and thereby revoke the
transfer of custody and the termination of parental rights along with
her consent to the adoption. "41 In other words, the natural mother
understood the right of revocation to be absolute.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal interpreted the act of surrender
as follows:
Clearly, the act of surrender and its three effects are as stated
by the language "completely irrevocable if no written opposition ....

[is executed or served.]" Since execution of the act

expressed in those statutes .... The role of this court is limited to construing the adoption
statutes and attempting to ascertain the meaning of the legislature as expressed therein."
464 P.2d at 689-90.
34. See In re G.O., 433 So. 2d 1115 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); In re J.E.C., 487
So. 2d 675 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
35. In re G.O., 433 So. 2d 1115 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
36. Id. at 1117.
37. Id.
38. In re J.E.C., 487 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
39. La. R.S. 9:422.8 (Supp. 1987).
40. In re J.E.C., 487 So. 2d at 678.
41.

Id.
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of surrender has already accomplished the transfer of custody
and termination of the parental rights, the use of the word
"opposition" can only have reference to something which has
not as yet been accomplished. The only thing which had not
as yet been accomplished was the adoption. Consequently, "opreference to the natural parent's conposition" could only have
42
sent to the adoption.
The court based its conclusion on the fact that the transfer of
custody and termination of the parental rights had already been accomplished. 43 The court's reasoning is circular because this was the very
issue to be decided. Whether these two effects have actually been accomplished depends on the validity of the consent in question.
Even accepting the reasoning of the court, it is inconceivable to
expect the natural mother, at such a stressful time, to comprehend such
a complicated construction of the statutory language. In many instances
the parent is an unmarried mother with limited finances." In this vulnerable position, the young parent may be easily influenced by social
and family pressures to give up the child for adoption.4 When the
parent signs a consent to an adoption, she "sets in motion a complex
statutory process. If within a few days or weeks the parent has a change
of heart, and attempts to revoke that consent, . . . she may find that
the adoption process, once set in motion, moves ineluctably to the final
Upon execution of the final decree, the parental
adoption decree."
rights are terminated.
Along with the hope that a more informed decision will increase
the probability of the validity of the consent, it would certainly be
beneficial to all parties concerned to clarify the limited nature of the
right of revocation.

42. Id. at 679.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Janet G. v. New York Foundling Hosp., 94 Misc. 2d 133, 403 N.Y.S.
2d 646, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1978), in which the consent of a seventeen year old mother was
found to be deficient because at the time of execution, she was "alone and uncounseled,
faced with a printed form surrender prepared by the State." See generally, Annot., "Right
of Natural Parent to Withdraw Valid Consent to Adoption of Child," 74 A.L.R.3d 421,
435-37 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Duncan v. Harden, 234 Ga. 425, 214 S.E. 2d 890 (1975). See generally,

Annot., "What Constitutes Duress in Obtaining Parent's Consent to Adoption of Child
or Surrender of Child to Adoption Agency," 74 A.L.R.3d 527 (1976); Annot., "What
Constitutes Undue Influence in Obtaining a Parent's Consent to Adoption of Child," 50
A.L.R.3d 918 (1973); Annot., "Mistake or Want of Understanding as Ground for Revocation of Consent to Adoption or of Agreement Releasing Infant to Adoption Placement
Agency," 74 A.L.R.3d 489 (1976).
46. Frieden, supra note 1, at 617.
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In a recent New York case, In Re Sarah K.,41 the mother argued
that, on constitutional grounds, "the statute . .. should require that

biological parents be informed that, upon revocation, they do not necessarily secure the return of their child, but may face a best interests
hearing in which they stand on equal footing with the adoptive par-

ents."" 8 Since the natural parents failed to exercise a revocation within
the stipulated period, the court reasoned that they did not have standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. 49 Notably, however, the

court concluded its opinion by recognizing the need for affirmative
action by the legislature:
While the issues before us are resolved without reaching the
constitutionality of the statute, we note that the reforms of 1972
were motivated by the Legislature's concern that controversy and
uncertainty overhung adoptions. Because certain dissatisfactions

with the statute in its actual application have now several times
been identified in the case law and literature, we believe it would
be highly desirable for the Legislature to examine [the statute]
in the light of [thirteen] years' experience, for it appears that

the well-founded concerns that engendered the law are not yet
dispelled.50
Because of the similarities of the statutory reforms of New York and
Louisiana in substance' as well as in the concerns which motivated
them,5 2 the Louisiana Legislature would be well-advised to take notice

of the insightful statements of this New York Court.
Recommendations
One possible solution would be for the legislature to mandate the

use of a particular formal act of surrender form. Presently, there is a
form available in the Code of Civil Procedure." This form, entitled
"Parents' Formal Act of Surrender of a Child for Private Adoption,"

47. In Re Sarah K., 66 N.Y. 2d 223, 487 N.E. 2d 241, 496 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (1985).
48. Id.at 236, 487 N.E. 2d at 247, 496 N.Y.S. 2d at 390.
49. Id.at 240, 487 N.E. 2d at 250, 496 N.Y.S. 2d at 393.
50. Id.at 242, 487 N.E. 2d at 251, 496 N.Y.S. 2d at 394.
51. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 115-b (McKinney 1977 and Supp. 1987) provides for the
irrevocability of consent after 30 days from the commencement of adoption proceedings
unless written notice is received within this period. This revocation is given effect only
if it is determined that this would serve the best interests of the child.
52. The Sarah K. court stated that "[a]n effort was made by this reform to introduce
certainty and finality by limiting a parent's right to revoke consent, with the stated
intention of balancing the rights of surrendering parents, adoptive parents and children."
66 N.Y. 2d 223, 234, 487 N.E. 2d 241, 246, 496 N.Y.S. 2d 384, 389.
53. La. Code Civ. P., Form No. 2563(b) (Supp. 1987).
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states that "this Act of Surrender grants . .. irrevocable consent to the
adoption, subject only to the exceptions of law found in Section 9:422.10."
Even if one chooses to comply with this form, the result may still be
unsatisfactory. The form refers only to Section 9:422. 10, 4 which deals
primarily with the procedural requirements of revocation. Reading Section 9:422.10 out of context can still lead to the erroneous belief that
the right of revocation is absolute. Instead, Section 9:422.10 must be
read together with Section 9:422.11, the pertinent part of which states
that "the withdrawal of the consent ... of the parents who . . . executed
the formal act of surrender shall not bar a final or interlocutory decree
of adoption, if the decree is in the best interests of the child."
The deficiency in the form could be corrected by a requirement in
Section 9:422.6 similar to the Georgia legislative solution which demands
that the surrender form used conform substantially to the form provided
by the statute. The Georgia form clearly states that "[one has] the right
51 6
Of
to withdraw [a] surrender within ten days from the date [signed]."
course, in Louisiana, further language would be needed to explain clearly
that revocation during this period does not guarantee the return of the
child to the natural mother. This would ensure that the natural parent
has at least been exposed to this vital information, thus better guaranteeing a valid consent.
Another proposal would be to require that all consents to private
adoptions be executed before a court. The imposition of judicial supervision would reduce the potential for fraud, duress, or misunderstanding,5 7 since "the court, representing the public, can see that the
parents when they consent to the adoption of their children are informed
and fully understand the effect of the act which they are performing." 58
There are, however, disadvantages to requiring court supervised consents. One would be the burden placed on the judicial system. Furthermore, many parents may be unwilling to come into court to execute
the surrender. This latter drawback may be overcome, however, by the
use of a procedure similar to one adopted by Utah.5 9 The Utah system
provides for the appointment of a commissioner "to take [the parent's]
written consent and to certify the same to the court. The commissioner
shall explain to such person the legal significance of such consent, and
shall certify to the court his findings as to whether or not the consent

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

La. R.S. 9:422.10 (Supp. 1987).
La. R.S. 9:422.11 (Supp. 1987).
Ga. Code Ann. 19-8-4 (c)(2) (1982 and Supp. 1986).
Frieden, supra note 1, at 633-34.
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-8 comment (1953).
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-8 (1953).
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is freely given. ' 60 Thus, the cautionary advantages of judicial supervision
are achieved with a minumum of intimidation to the parties.
There are additional measures that could be taken to insure an
informed consent. For instance, an attorney may transcribe conversations
with the natural mother, along with a signed statement of consent in
the mother's own words, for evidentiary purposes, as well as to em61
phasize to her the impact of her actions.
Conclusion
The legislature has chosen to place emphasis on the child's best
interest, thereby rejecting the parental preference standard previously
employed. The purpose of this comment is not to challenge the wisdom
of that decision, but rather to suggest that the legislature go one step
further by ensuring that all parties have knowledge of this legislative
policy choice which so drastically alters a parent's rights.
Clearly this requirement would be beneficial to all parties involved
in the adoption process. First, the natural mother would want to be
informed of the limited nature of her right to revoke the adoption before
signing the surrender. Second, the adoptive parents would feel more
secure in their rights concerning the child. Above all, the conveyance
of this information would serve the best interests of the child. The
finality of the adoption decree hinges directly on the validity of the
consent. The final adoption decree must not be vulnerable to later claims
of ignorance, fraud, or error by the natural mother. By reducing potential
claims of fraud, misunderstanding, and attendant litigation, the child
will be allowed to settle into a single, stable environment.
Jane A. Robert

60.
61.

Id.
Frieden, supra note 1, at 631.

